Post-independence

Cyprus was declared an independent state on August 16, 1960. The constitution of the new state, which was defined by the Zürich and London Agreements, was drawn up in terms that explicitly defined the two main ethnic communities in Cyprus, the numerically larger Greek Cypriot community at approximately 80% of the total Cypriot population and the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community at approximately 18% of the total Cypriot population. These agreements were atypical in that they granted the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community political rights within the new republic greater than those of just an ethnic minority community. They were also atypical in that they placed certain limits within the constitution on the absolute independence of the new republic, with certain articles deemed unalterable as well as granting rights and responsibilities to the external guarantor states of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The complexity and limits on the new Republic’s independence of these agreements was a reflection of the complex situation in Cyprus pre independence, where there was little or no cohesive pan Cypriot national identity, with each of the two main ethnic communities seeking to pursue purely ethnic based visions for Cyprus’ future. Pre independence the Greek Cypriot community, on the whole considering themselves Greeks that happened to live in Cyprus rather than Cypriots with a Greek ethnic background, sought a Cypriot future based on Enosis, the ceding of Cyprus to Greece, as a natural stage after the end of British rule and a fulfilment of the Greek nationalist Megali Idea. For the Turkish Cypriot community who also on the whole tended to see themselves as Turks that happened to live in Cyprus rather than Cypriots with a Turkish ethnic background, the idea of Cyprus being handed over to Greece after the end of British rule and of them becoming Greek citizens in a Hellenic republic, with them having no effective say as a community in this fundamental matter related to their own lives, was an anathema. Largely in response to calls from the Greek Cypriots community for enosis the Turkish Cypriot community developed the concept of Taksim, the partition of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot controlled part, which would be free to pursue enosis as it saw fit and a Turkish Cypriot controlled part, despite the fact that the two ethnic communities were geographically intermingled throughout Cyprus and taksim by its very nature would have required mass population movements.[5] It is against this background that the Zürich and London Agreements were drawn up after lengthy negotiation principally by Greece Turkey and the United Kingdom and why they ended up being both complex and atypical granting the Turkish Cypriot community political rights disproportionate to their numerical numbers and containing permanent restrictions on the pursuit of both enosis and taksim alike. It is a common Greek Cypriot position that these agreements were imposed on them against their will by external powers and that despite Archbishop Makarios, as the recognised leader of the Greek Cypriot community putting his signature on them he did so only because he was forced too. There is no real doubt that great pressure was placed on Archbishop Makarios by both the United Kingdom and by Greece to sign the agreements, however it should also be pointed out that there is also little doubt that had the agreements been put before the two communities in referenda, which was not a legal requirement for them to carry legal validly, the two communities would have given their support to these agreements, as even the pro enosis authors of the Akritas plan were to admit.[6]

In the period from independence in 1960 to 1963 a series of disputes arose between the two communities over the implementation and interpretation of the agreements and constitution. These disputes centred on 70;30 ratio of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the public service mandated by the constitution but never achieved in practice, the establishment of separate municipalities as required by the constitution also not achieved, the use by the Turkish Cypriot leadership of its veto on tax legislation as a means of gaining leverage on the other areas of dispute and the status of the Turkish Cypriot vice president who constitutionally had a veto on foreign policy but complained of frequently not being informed of foreign policy initiatives by the Greek Cypriot foreign minister. Relations between the two communities became increasingly strained in this period and distrust on both sides grew with both sides preparing for physical confrontation with the establishment of armed irregulars as well as military officers from the two communities respective ‘motherlands’.[7] In November 1963 Archbishop Makarios, by then the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution. It is claimed then and now that the intent of these amendments was simply to try and make the cumbersome 60’s agreements and constitution more workable and remove causes of friction. Whilst it is true that the amendments did address these issues they also removed nearly all of the political protections the Turkish Cypriot community had gained in the 1960 agreements and essentially represented a fundamental altering of the entire basis of the 1960 agreements.[8] The proposed amendments were immediately reject first by Turkey and then later by the Turkish Cypriot Vice- President Dr. Kutchuk. On 21 December 1963 a street brawl in a Turkish quarter in Nicosia between a Turkish Cypriot crowd and Yorgadjis’, the Greek Cypriot interior minister, plainclothes special constables was followed immediately by a major Greek Cypriot attack by the various para-military forces against the Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and in Larnaca.[9] Against this background of a breakdown of internal security in Cyprus and inter-communal violence that threaten to bring into direct conflict the two NATO members of Greece and Turkey during the height of the cold war, the United Kingdom and the USA first tried to implement a neutral NATO force to be stationed within Cyprus to prevent further inter-communal conflict. The Makarios government blocked this move and the United Kingdom then raised the matter with the UN security council in a letter of 15 February 1964. The Makarios government also raised issues of alleged preparation by Turkey for an imminent and obvious invasion of Cyprus in a letter to the Security Council also on the 15 February 1964. The Security Council debated the unfolding crisis in Cyprus at its 1094th to 1103rd meetings from the 17 February to 4 March 1964,[10] the result of which was UN Security Council resolution 186 of the 4th March 1964,[11] which established a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus that remains to this day.

By 1974, dissatisfaction among Greek nationalist right-wing elements in favour of the long-term goal of unification with Greece precipitated a coup d’etat against President Makarios which was sponsored by the military government of Greece and led by Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard. The Greek military junta and their suporters attempted to assassinate President Makarios. The new regime replaced Makarios with Nikos Giorgiades Sampson as president, and Bishop Gennadios as head of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Seven days after these events Turkey invaded Cyprus by sea and air on 20 July 1974. At the time Turkey claimed it was invading to uphold its obligation under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee “to re-enstate the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus”. The coup was dissolved after strong resistance by the Greek Cypriot people, however the constitution was replaced only in the free areas of Cyprus, not under the Turkish occupation army. Talks in Geneva involving Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the two Cypriot factions stalled and on August 12 Turkey offered a proposal for a communal system, with confederate cantons, and gave Greece 24 hours to accept.[12] The talks soon collapsed after Turkish planes attacked Nicosia,[13] and Turkish forces subsequently moved from the previous cease-fire lines to gain control of 37% of the island’s territory. During the invasion, 200,000 Greek Cypriots[14] were displaced from their home land. While this was happening, the entire Turkish Cypriot male population of Tokhni was massacred by Greek Cypriot paramilitaries in reprisal for the landings. Further mass graves were uncovered in Aloa, Sandalaris and Maratha.[15] As of today, there are still 1,468 Greek Cypriots and 502 Turkish Cypriots unaccounted for as well as over 150,000 Greek Cypriot refugees and over 60,000 Turkish Cypriot displaced persons.[16] The events of the summer of 1974 have dominated Cypriot politics ever since and have been a major point of contention between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as Greece and Turkey.
Limassol seafront
Limassol seafront

Since 1974, there have been continual efforts to negotiate a settlement, which met with varying levels of disagreement from either side. The Turkish government arranged an influx of settlers from Turkey whose exact numbers are disputed, but believed to be in the range of over 100,000, thus altering the demographics of the island against the rules of the Geneva Convention. Turkey counters that the Turkish Cypriots - before 1963 - owned and farmed 33% of Cypriot land before being forced into enclaves by the TMT (the Turkish Cypriot counter organisation to EOKA and later EOKA-B), thus the take-over of one-third of Cyprus was seen as compensating the Turkish Cypriots for their lost land. These figures are rejected by both the Colonial land registry and the Cyprus Republic Authorities as fictional. According to the records held by the Cyprus Land Registry, only 12.3% of all Cypriot land, or 16.7% of privately owned land was owned by Turkish Cypriots. Of the 3,240 square kilometres of the occupied area, 60.27% is owned by Greek Cypriots, 16.39% is owned by Turkish Cypriots and 23.09% is state owned land.

Turkish Cypriots proclaimed a separate state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), under Rauf Denktaş on November 15, 1983. The UN Security Council, in its Resolution 541 of November 18, 1983, declared the action legally invalid and called for a withdrawal of Turkish troops. The above-mentioned Resolutions also asked all states to refrain from recognising the declaration, which was created through secessionist actions, and not to facilitate or in any other way aid the secessionist entity. Turkey is the only country to date that recognises the administration on the northern third of Cyprus in violation of the resolution. Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus’s authority over the whole island, and refers to it as the Greek Cypriot administration.

In 2004, the UN-backed Annan Plan for Cyprus sought to reunify the island before EU accession. Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan whilst Greek Cypriots rejected it, with the result that the island entered the EU as a divided country. EU countries recognise the official government and still officially treat the North as a militarily occupied area: although this has affected discussions with Turkey over accession, it has not prevented them, and EU ministers have repeatedly stressed their intention to open direct trade links with the occupied area. The EU Acquis communautaire applies only to those (Greek) areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus.

Since the invasion, the economy of Cyprus has grown greatly and citizens of the Republic in particular enjoy a high standard of living. The north maintains a lower standard of living due to international embargoes, and is still reliant on Turkey for aid, though increased revenues through tourism and a recent construction boom have led to rapid economic development in recent years. The Turkish Cypriot administration has allowed the illegal sale of real estate, consisting almost entirely of property and land still owned by Greek Cypriots from before the 1974 Turkish invasion, to private buyers from overseas. In 2005, the UK’s Guardian newspaper reported that up to 10,000 Europeans had invested in property in the north of Cyprus, a trend that still causes concern in the south. This concern was highlighted by the UK’s Daily Telegraph newspaper in 2006 when Cherie Blair, the wife of Britain’s prime minister, touched a diplomatic nerve; Mrs Blair, in her capacity as an advocate at law, represented a UK couple, the Orams, who had been taken to court by Greek Cypriots who claimed ownership of the land on which the Orams had built a house. President Tassos Papadopoulos referred to Blair’s decision to represent the Orams as “a provocative action”.

On 5 December 2006, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended a further six-month extension in the mandate of the UN mission that has been deployed on the island for over four decades. Mr. Annan said that while the situation remained “calm and stable with no major violations of the ceasefire lines,” he regretted the continued stalemate in the political process and the “missed opportunities” over the past 10 years. In July of 2006, the Island served as a safe haven for Lebanese displaced by the conflict between Israel and